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1 Introduction
International and regional conicts are more commonplace that one would like.1 In re-
sponse, there is now a signicant theoretical and empirical literature on the economics of
conict. The theoretical literature follows the seminal work of Hirshleifer (1988) and devel-
ops game-theoretic models where two rival groups allocate resources between productive and
appropriative activities (see, for example, Brito and Intriligator (1985), Hirshleifer (1995),
Grossman and Kim (1996), Skaperdas (1992), Neary (1997), and Skaperdas and Syropoulos
(2002)). Recent contributions by Anderton, Anderton, and Carter (1999), Skaperdas and
Syropoulos (1996, 2001), Garnkel, Skaperdas and Syropoulos (2008), and Findlay and Amin
(2008) emphasize trade and conict in two-country frameworks and Becsi and Lahiri (2007)
consider a three-country model. Anderson and Marcouiller (2005) examine the consequences
of endogenous transaction costs in the form of predation on international trade.
The benets of war in these classes of models come mainly from a gain of resources,
and the costs of warfare is the use of soldiers and consequent foregone production as labor is
diverted toward warfare. This cost has been the focus of the recent trade theoretic literature
on conict (Skaperdas and Syropoulos, 2001, Syropolous, 2004, Becsi and Lahiri, 2007).
We build upon this framework by incorporating elements of peace dividends which
would arise should the conict be resolved. Our framework has three countries. Two of
the countries are in conict with each other and the third country is the source of foreign
investments to the two warring countries. We also introduce a factor that represents a general
level of disruption to economic activities in both warring countries. The war equilibrium is
specied as a Nash one where each warring country decides on its war eort taking as given
the war eort of the adversary. Therefore, in our framework peace dividends associated with
a reduction in war activities have two components: (i) a general reduction in disruption
in economic activities increasing welfare directly, and (ii) an increase in the ow of foreign
investments. The latter can occur directly because a reduction in war eorts and indirectly
via induced reduction in disruptions.
The purpose of the paper is to examine the eect of, starting from the initial war equi-
librium, bilateral piecemeal reductions in war eorts on welfare levels in the three countries
and on the inow of foreign investments in the warring nations.
2 The Model
We develop a three-country, many-good, many-factor model with two of the countries |
called country a and country b | engaged in a war with each other and a third country |
called country c | that does not take part in the war but is the source of foreign investments
in the warring countries. All product and factor markets are perfectly competitive. There
are many inelastically supplied factors of production; however, three of the factors play
important roles in our analysis. For expositional ease, we shall call these factors labor,
capital and land although one could interpret them dierently. The warring countries use
labor to ght the war and land is what they ght for. We dene f(La
s;Lb
s) as the net gain
1According to Gleditsch (2004), there were 199 international wars and 251 civil wars between 1816 and
2002.
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of land by country a from war,2 where La
s and Lb
s are respectively the amount of `soldiers'
employed by country a and b.3 For this net-gain function we make the following assumptions.
Assumption 1 f() is homogeneous of degree zero in the two arguments and f1 > 0; f2 < 0.




s;  V a+f(La
s;Lb




s;  V b   f(La
s;Lb
s);  Kb + F b) and Rc(p;  Lc;  V c;  Kc   F a   F b) where  Li,  Ki and  V i are the
endowments of labor and land respectively in country i, p is the international price vector
of the non-numeraire goods, and F i is the amount of foreign investment from country c to




s) represent the `disruptive' eect of a war
on the two warring countries. That is, getting involved in a war not only costs the countries
resources in the form of soldiers who are no longer productively employed in the private
sector, but also reduces overall economic activities for given level of endowments. These
functions are assumed to be decreasing functions of the total number of soldiers employed
between the two warring countries, i.e., La
s +Lb
s, which represents the scale of the war in our
framework. The absolute values of 0
aRa and 0
bRb can be interpreted as the extent of one
type `peace dividends' in the two countries. The other type of peace dividend in our model
will appear via changes in the level of foreign investments even when 0
a = 0
b = 0.
We assume that the three factors are complements to one other, i.e., Ri
jk  0; j 6=
k = 2;3;4; i = a;b;c: Formally,
Assumption 2 Ri
jk  0; j 6= k = 2;3;4; i = a;b;c:
The consumption side of the economies is represented by the expenditure functions
Ea(p;ua), Eb(p;ub) andEc(p;uc), where ui is the utility level of a representative consumer
in country i (i = a;b;c).5



































































The left-hand sides in (1)-(2) are expenditures and the right-hand sides are total
factor incomes net of repatriated income due to foreign investments. In (3), the right-hand
side is total factor income plus repatriated income from outward foreign investments.
2This can be viewed as the reduced form of a `contest' payo function.
3The net gain function takes negative values when country b `wins' the war.
4All factors other than land, capital and labor are suppressed in the revenue functions as they do not
change in our analysis. As is well known, the partial derivative of a revenue function with respect to a
factor endowment gives the price of that factor. The revenue functions are negative semi-denite in the
endowments of the factors of production. In particular, they satisfy Ri
jj  0; for i = a;b;c and j = 2;3;4.
For these and other properties of revenue functions see Dixit and Norman (1980).
5The partial derivative of an expenditure function with respect to the utility level is the reciprocal of the
marginal utility of income.
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Foreign investments are endogenous, and the equilibrium is achieved when the rates










Having stated the basic model, we now turn to the derivation of the war equilibrium.
2.1 The War equilibrium

































































































































































An increase in the inow of foreign investment reduces the rental rate of capital and
thus the level of income repatriated out, and this increases welfare in the two recipient
countries and reduces that in the source country (the last terms in (5)-(7)). An increase in
the employment of soldiers in a country has a number of conicting eects on that country.
It increases disruption and reduces welfare (rst term); it reduces productive activities by
reducing the supply of workers and thus reduces welfare (second term); it increases supply
of land and this increases welfare (third term); it also aects repatriated income and thus
welfare (the last three terms). An increase in the employment of soldiers in a country also has
international externalities. It aects the source country via changes in repatriated income.
It aects the other warring country by (i) increasing disruption and reducing welfare (rst
term); (ii) reducing land and thus welfare (second term); and (iii) changing repatriated
income by altering the rate of return to capital (the last two terms).
Dierentiating the equations in (4), we rst of nd how the levels of foreign invest-
ments F a and F b change with changes in the levels of war eorts La
s and Lb
s, and these are
given the Appendix (see (A.1) and (A.2)). Then substituting (A.1) and (A.2) into (5)-(7),
we obtain how changes in the war eorts aect the levels of welfare in all three countries,
and these are given the Appendix (see (A.3)-(A.5)).
Before turning to the determination of the war equilibrium, let us explain how war
aects the inow of foreign investments in the two warring countries. We shall explain only
(A.1), and the explanation of (A.2) is similar. There are two broad channels via which war
aects the inow of foreign investments. First, it has a disruptive eect on the two countries
reducing the rate of return to investment in both countries. The reduction of the rate of
return in one country reduces the inow of foreign investment in that country and increases
that in the other warring country. These eects are given by the terms involving 0
a and 0
b
in (A.1). The other channel works via changes in the rates of return to capital because of
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changes in the levels of endowments (both labor and land) induced by war and because of
the complementarity between the factors of production. The second channel operates even
when 0
a = 0
b = 0; i.e., even in the absence of disruptions.
Having derived the welfare equations for the two warring nations, we are now in a
position to describe the war equilibrium. Each country sets the level of the employment of
soldiers by maximizing its welfare, taking the level of soldiers in the other country as given,
That is, by setting @ua=@La
s = @ub=@Lb







































































The left-hand sides of (8) and (9) give the sum of the marginal cost of diverting workers
from the productive sectors to war (rst term), marginal benet of increased landholding
for the marginal soldier (second term), and the marginal cost from disruption in productive
activities. The right-hand sides give marginal eects via changes in repatriated prots due to
changes in the rate of return to capital. An increase in war eort reduces the rate of return
to capital in the waring countries because of the disruptive nature of war and this reduced
repatriated income (for given levels of foreign investments). This eect (represented by the
terms involving 0
a and 0
b on the right hand side of (8) and (9)) will tend to increase war
eorts. There are other terms on the right hand side of (8) and (9) that aect repatriated
income even in the absence of disruption to economic activities.
3 Peace Dividends
Having described the theoretical framework in the previous section, we shall now examine
how, starting from the war equilibrium dened above, a bilateral piecemeal reduction in
war eorts aects the welfare in the two warring countries and in the source country of
foreign investments. We shall also examine how such reductions aect the ow of foreign
investments into the warring countries. In doing so we shall identify eects that appear
because of a reduction in overall disruptions to economic activities given by the -functions
and those that would appear even in the absence of the disruptions.
In our analysis, we shall assume that in the absence of peace dividend | i.e., when
0
a = 0
b = F a = F b = 0 | it benets a country to employ an extra soldier, i.e.,
(@ui=@Li
s)j0
i=Fi=0  0; (i = a;b). Formally,
Assumption 3 Ra
2   Ra
3f1  0 and Rb
2 + Rb
3f2  0.
6We implicitly assume the second-order conditions for the optimization problems and the Nash-stability
conditions to be satised. However, since we do not undertake any comparative static exercise on the
equilibrium values of the soldiers, we do not need those conditions explicitly. We use the war equilibrium
conditions to simply the eect of a piecemeal multilateral reduction of the employment of soldiers, starting
from the war equilibrium, on welfare and on the inow of foreign investments.
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Substituting (8) and (9) into (A.3)-(A.5) and imposing symmetry between the two
warring countries (which implies, inter alia, f1 =  f2), we get






0   R42)dLs; (10)
where the absence of superscripts from variables and functions implies that they refer to the
identical warring country.
From (10) the following proposition follows.
Proposition 1 A bilateral reduction in war eorts by two identical warring countries : (i)
improves the welfare of both of them under assumptions 1 and 3, and (ii) improves the welfare
of the source country of foreign investment under assumptions 1 and 2.
A reduction in the employment of soldiers in a warring country does not aect the
welfare of that country as the initial number of soldiers is set at the optimal level (the
Envelope theorem). The warring countries are aected, however, via changes in the level of
negative international externalities. Starting from the initial war equilibrium, the level of
this negative externalities goes down with reduced employment of soldiers. As for the source
country of foreign investments, it benets because a reduction in the number of soldiers
increases the rate of return to capital invested in the destination warring countries via two
channels: (i) by increasing the supply of labor to the productive sector and thus raising the
rate of return to capital due to the assumption of complementarity between the factors of
production (assumption 2), and (ii) by reducing disruption in the warring countries.
Turning to the eect on foreign investments, substituting (8) and (9) into (A.1) and
imposing symmetry between the two warring countries, we nd
dF =  R44 [2R4
0   R42] dLs; (11)
whence the following proposition follows.
Proposition 2 Under assumptions 1 and 2, a bilateral reduction in war eorts by two
identical warring countries increases the ow of foreign investments in both countries.
As mentioned before, a bilateral reduction in war eorts increases the rate of return
to capital in the warring countries increasing the inow of foreign capital in those countries.
Thus, a bilateral reduction in war eorts provides peace dividends to the warring countries
in two ways: it reduces disruptions in their economic activities and this has a direct positive
eect on welfare and also an indirect positive eect on welfare via inducing an increased ow
of foreign investments.
We conclude our analysis by noting from (10) and (11) all our qualitative results go
through even when 0
a = 0
b = 0, that is in the absence of any general disruptive eects of
wars. However, the eects on the welfare of source country of foreign investment and on the
levels of foreign investments are higher in the presence of the disruptive eects.
4 Conclusion
Conicts for resources between nations or groups within a national are more widespread than
one would like. They are often unproductive causing disruptions in economic activities and
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discourage foreigners from investing in the warring countries. A full or partial resolution of
the conict brings in peace dividends by reducing the costs associated with wars that were
mentioned above. In this paper we develop a trade-theoretic model of three countries. Two
of them are engaged in a conict for land, diverting productive labor away from the private
sector into the war as soldiers. The third country is the source country of foreign investments
for the two warring countries.
In the above framework, we examine the eects of a bilateral reduction in war eorts,
starting from an initial war equilibrium, on the levels of welfare in the three countries and
on the levels of foreign investments in the two warring countries. We nd that when the
two warring countries are symmetric, such reductions in war eorts increase welfare in all
three countries. Welfare improvements occur due to reductions in disruptions to economic
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